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Modelled on the British style of Arts Council, the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) was 
established in 2005 as an autonomous and consensus-based organisation. The creation 
of ARKO was expected to redefine the arts-state relationship in South Korea by 
developing arts subsidy operating at an arm’s length distance from the government. 
However, this has not happened because Korean arts policy is so deeply embedded in 
the country’s historical and political contexts that changes in its formal structure and 
organisation hardly guarantee the emergence of a new understanding and practice of 
state arts funding. Despite the rhetoric of the arm’s length principle, the government’s 
habitual control has persisted and even been reinforced. Meanwhile, the historically 
and politically rooted division within the arts sector has hindered the formation of 
sectoral consensus on the arts-state relationship and the ARKO’s operation, leaving 
the sector continuously dependent on a strong state. 
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[I]n the era of the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation, the arts subsidy system in Korea was 
the same as that in France. That is, it was categorised as a model of ‘central ministry’. 
Therefore, the arrival of the Arts Council Korea meant that Korea’s arts funding system 
changed from the French ‘central ministry’ style to the British/Canadian model of ‘Arts 
Council [supervised by the ministry]’[…]. (Presidential Advisory Committee for Policy 
Planning 2008)  
 
Cultural policy is embedded in local contexts. Thus, it is not surprising that cultural 
policy in the Republic of Korea (Korea hereafter) substantially differs from those in 
Western Europe and North America – which have been the primary focus of the 
existing literature of cultural policy – in terms of the policy’s shape and operation as 
well as the role of culture in society and its relation to the state. Often Korea borrows 
cultural policy discourses and strategies from the West, but their actual uses and 
consequences are not predictable as they are contested and negotiated within the 
country’s historical, political and socio-economic conditions. This is what exactly 
happened when the country tried to develop non-interventionist arts policy by setting 
up an Arts Council ‘modelled after the British2 style of Arts Council’ (Interviewee 1). 
Contrary to the expectation of government and the arts sector, however, the creation 
of an Arts Council hardly redefined the nature of the relationship between the arts and 
the state in Korea.  
Like other policy areas in the country, arts policy has long been characterised 
by the ‘strong state’. It was not until the 1990s, under the first civilian government 
after a long period of military rule, that the policy began actively seeking the 
participation of arts practitioners and experts. Such trend was accelerated under the 
subsequent two Democratic governments (1998-2003 and 2003-2008) who pursued 
political democracy and economic liberalisation. The establishment of the Arts 
Council Korea (ARKO hereafter) in 2005 was seen, by many commentators, as an 
                                                 
2 In the Korean discourse of the Arts Council, the Arts Council of Great Britain (1946-1994) and the 
Arts Council England (1994-) have been a focal point of reference. Both of them are often called the 
‘British Arts Council’.  
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indicator of a progressive shift towards artists-driven policy making. The ARKO, as 
an ‘autonomous’ body that would operate at an ‘arm’s length’ from the government, 
was expected to safeguard the arts from state intervention. At the same time, it was 
intended to facilitate ‘consensus-based’ policy making, as an alternative to hierarchy 
and power concentration, which had been a major feature of the existing arts policy in 
Korea. However, the last six years have seen the ARKO functioning mostly as an 
organisation, vulnerable to governmental intervention and party politics, rather than 
proving itself as an alternative policy model. The crisis of the ARKO was overly felt 
when its second chairperson, who was appointed by the outgoing Democratic 
government, was forced to resign in 2008 by the current Grand National government 
but the arts sector, as a whole, could not challenge the government interference in 
defence of the ARKO’s autonomy.   
 This article tries to explain why instituting the Arts Council in Korea has been 
such difficult. It finds that Korean arts policy is so deeply embedded in its historical 
and political path that change in its formal structure and organisation hardly 
guarantees an emergence of a new understanding and practice of state arts funding. 
Despite the creation of the ARKO, the state’s hands-on approach to the arts has not 
been really questioned, allowing the government to continue its ‘habitual’ control 
over arts funding. The lacking of sectoral consensus and the tension between peak 
organisations3 have also deterred the arts sector from strengthening its position vis-à-
vis government. Consequently, the Arts Council model of arts funding has been left 
much admired but perhaps mismatched with the overall context of arts policy in 
Korea. The findings of this article are based on an analysis of related policy texts and 
news reports as well as academic literature. The policy texts include government 
reports, publications for seminars and hearings, articles in ARKO’s own monthly 
magazines the Korean Culture & Arts Journal and the minutes of the Council 
meetings from 2005 to 2011 (hereafter called minutes). In addition, interviews were 
                                                 
3 In this article, ‘peak organisation (or peak association)’ refers to a large-scale and influential 
association that represents its member. One of its main roles is to influence government policy in the 
related area by promoting its causes, lobbying politicians and participating in the policy making 
process. Peak organisations are distinguished from common interest groups and associations in that 
they have more access to and power to affect policy making. The more corporatist approach the 
government takes, the more crucial roles peak organisations are expected to play in public decision 
making.  
 5 
carried out with seven anonymous commentators between April and August 2011.4 
All quotes from the literature written in Korean were translated by the author. 
 
Arts Council as an Institution  
The arm’s length arts council, as an institution, has been described as ‘distinctively British’ 
for two reasons. First, the ACGB [Arts Council of Great Britain] was the first of its kind. 
Second, the arm’s length arts council had been developed from the experience of other British 
cultural institutions […]. (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989, p. 54) 
 
Arts Council refers to a non-governmental body that is designed to distribute public 
money, on behalf of the government, to the arts sector according to its own artistic 
and professional judgements (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989, Redcliffe-
Maud 1976). The Arts Council of Great Britain created in 1946 was the first of its 
kind (it was split into Arts Council England, Arts Council of Wales and Scottish Arts 
Council in 1994). Since then, many countries have set up their own version of Arts 
Council.5 Its organisational characteristics would typically include having a Council 
consisting of a number of private individuals as its governing body and involving 
artists and arts experts in decision making (i.e., peer review). As an institution, the 
Arts Council encompasses not only the formal organisation and structure but also a 
set of shared understanding and conventions among participants in policy making as 
regards the relation between the arts and the state, rationales behind public arts 
subsidy and the process and criteria of funding decisions. The shared understanding 
and conventions shape the way in which arts policy is made by influencing the 
participants’ assumptions, informing their relations and guiding their behaviour. In 
short, they are likely to function as normative and cultural parameters of arts policy 
making (March and Olsen 1984, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, W.R. Scott 2001).  
The Arts Council, as an institution, reflects the distinct way of governing 
society and, at the same time, a dominant form of social control of expert knowledge 
in Britain (Rueschemeyer 1983). It is a product of the British government and the arts 
                                                 
4 The interviewees consisted of government officers, cultural policy researchers and a cultural manager. 
The seven semi-structured interviews took place in either their office or a public place for 45 minutes 
to two hours between April and August 2011. The interviewees have been anonymised as agreed.   
5 Since the Arts Council of Great Britain was created in 1946, many countries, including the market-
driven US and interventionist countries in continental Europe and Asia, have set up their own version 
of Arts Council. According to the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies, 
thirty or so among its members are national Arts Councils or similar types of bodies such as 
endowment, fund or foundation publicly funded. However, the nature of state-arts relationship in the 
countries tends to vary in spite of their common use of intermediary national arts funding organisations. 
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sector’s strong belief in the state’s laissez-faire approach to the arts. The belief, which 
derived from the country’s long tradition of liberal politics, led to a broad consensus 
that using an intermediary Arts Council would allow the state to intervene in the arts 
indirectly thus minimising the risk of exerting political influences on them. In this 
sense, the Arts Council’s relationship with the government has been defined by the 
political convention of the ‘arm’s length principle’. This aptly concurred with the 
Romantic idea of the arts that saw arts making as an unpredictable and mysterious 
sphere of human activity, therefore it cannot and should not be governed by politics 
(Keynes 2000[1945]). The justification of state arts subsidy in Britain was grounded 
in the social legitimacy of the (fine) arts, which was gained through a complex 
historical process. The process consisted of the autonomisation and 
professionalisation of the arts and the increased recognition of their social values – 
such as educating, enlightening and transforming effects for the mass population – by 
the middle classes whose class distinction was closely tied to arts consumption (H.-K. 
Lee 2008, Minihan 1977, see DiMaggio 1986 for the similar historical process in the 
US). The tight coupling of arts patronage with the class-based consensus on the 
values of the arts implied that the Arts Council could not be easily brought into the 
political arena where the definition of arts themselves and goals of arts funding would 
be subject to negotiations between different social classes and groups (Hutchinson 
1982, Williams 1979). The community arts movement (1970s to 1980s) and the 
socialist arts policy of the Greater London Council (early 1980s) radically challenged 
such feature of the British arts policy but their impacts were not weighty.  
Historically, the Arts Council as an institution showed a lack of formal 
frameworks as it was inclined to utilise informal mechanisms of coordinating policy 
making and grant decision. The Arts Council’s decision making relied considerably 
on the informal networks and consensus among public figures and professionals in 
the Arts Council, the government and the arts sector, who were likely to share similar 
social backgrounds (Hutchison 1982). Members of its governing body did not (still do 
not) represent art forms or expert areas but were expected to seek a common good for 
the sector. The consensus-based Arts Council constrained the scope of party politics 
in arts policy to a significant degree, especially during its first thirty or so years, when 
British politics themselves were defined as consensus politics between conservative 
and labour parties (Kavanagh and Morris 1994). Since the 1980s, the Arts Council 
has been more exposed to governmental intervention and policy swings between 
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different governments (Quinn 1997, Taylor 1995, 1997). At the same time, formal 
rules and procedures have developed with surge of the ‘evidence-based policy 
making’ and ‘audit culture’ in arts policy. The use of funding agreements and 
performance indicators is one example. Despite these dynamics, however, the 
institution of the Arts Council has shown persistence. Its fundamental features remain 
and clearly distinguish the British arts policy from those in other countries: the 
limited role of the government, the absence of involvement of wider social groups, 
the Arts Council organisation as the main player in making and implementing state 
arts funding, and the head-strong consensus on the arm’s length relationship between 
the arts and politics. The government’s substantial reliance on so-called ‘non-
departmental public bodies (NDPB)’ such as the Arts Council is found in many other 
policy areas, showing this is the British way of managing public affairs (T. Scott 
2000). It is within this context that over 95% of the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport's budget is allocated to its arm’s length NDPBs (Fisher and Figueria 2011, 
p. 10).6 
In the arts policy debate in Korea during the last ten or so years, however, the 
British style of Arts Council was likely to be de-contextualised to serve as an ideal 
‘model’ that Korean arts policy could adopt (e.g., Korea Culture & Tourism Policy 
Institute 2005). The Arts Council institution’s embeddedness was unseen and little 
attention was paid to the importance of its informal aspects. Many Korean 
commentators regarded the Arts Council as a policy model that could be instituted in 
Korea once the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) was introduced as a formal organisation 
with a set of rules and procedures.  
 
Arts policy in Korea: historical context  
The relationship between arts and the state in Korea should be contemplated within 
the country’s turbulent historical trajectory: the Japanese colonisation (1910-1945); 
the Korean War (1950-1953); national security and political stability as the nation’s 
key concern; the influx of Western culture; the dire poverty after the Korean War and 
the state-led economic development; the military dictatorship (1961 to 1993); 
political democracy and economic liberalisation since the 1990s; and the deepening 
                                                 
6 The UK’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport defines NDPBs as ‘bodies that have a role in the 
process of government but are not a government department or part of one and operate at an arm's 
length from Ministers’. The department lists 47 NDPBs, including Arts Council England. Available 
from: http://www.culture.gov.uk/about_us/our_sponsored_bodies/default.aspx#1 [Accessed on 8 June 
2011]. 
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of liberalisation of society and economy since the financial crisis in 1997 (Korea 
Culture & Tourism Policy Institute 2005, Y. Kim 1976, Park 2010, Yim 2002). 
Within such historical contexts, the state has played multiple roles in making policy 
for the arts: not only in planning, implantation, regulation, service delivery and 
resource mobilisation but also in providing funding and even legitimacy to the arts 
sector.  
 Unlike in Britain, state arts subsidy in Korea can hardly viewed as a 
consequence of a successful social legitimation of the arts. The weak legitimacy of 
the arts sector is largely attributable to the historical path and socio-economic 
conditions of Korean society. Suffering from the cultural discontinuity caused by the 
Japanese colonialism and the rapid influx of western culture after the Korean War, the 
country’s traditional arts – which used to be regarded as a profession for the lower 
classes7 – were reduced to minority activities without having the opportunity to gain 
social respectability. Some legitimacy was secured though their re-positioning as 
cultural heritage and the provision of protection by the state. Meanwhile, discourses 
and techniques imported from the West became dominant in both arts education and 
the practice of arts making, but Western arts forms have never become truly popular 
in Korea. Findings of various surveys of arts consumption in the country show that 
there exists a striking remoteness between the arts and the everyday life of most 
Korean people.8 Arts patronage by the middle classes cannot be taken for granted 
either. In Korea, the middle class is a socio-economic concept that focuses on real 
estate, income, occupation and educational attainment. The formation of these classes 
was related to the flexible social movability created by speedy economic growth since 
the 1960s and meritocratic education. The acquisition of cultural capitals such as 
artistic tastes did not play a noticeable role in this process.9 Being neither popular and 
                                                 
7 Traditional Korean society held artists in low esteem. Professional arts such as music, dance, play and 
drawing were treated as a job for the lower classes while the ruling and literati classes’ own pursuit of 
amateur arts was highly regarded as an essential part of the literati culture. The lack of social 
respectability of the arts in Korea existed until recent decades, exemplified by the middle class culture 
where parents typically discouraged their children from pursuing artistic professions.  
8 According to the 2010 Survey Report on Cultural Enjoyment published by the Ministry of Culture, 
Sports and Tourism and Korea Culture & Tourism Institute, only small percentage of the 5000 adults 
surveyed had attended arts events during the previous year: e.g., literary event 3.8%, art exhibition 
9.9%, dance 1.4%, play 11.2%, classical music and opera 4.8% and Korean traditional arts 
performance 5.7%. Meanwhile, the attendance rate of the cinema and pop concerts was 60.3% and 
7.6% respectively. 
9 The period since the financial crisis in 1997 has seen an intense liberalisation of Korean society and 
the middle classes’ rising consciousness of cultural distinction, in line with the widened economic 
inequality and lowered social mobility (D.-Y. Lee 2010). Nevertheless, their efforts at distinction still 
reply more on material rather than artistic consumption (J.-M. Kang 2008). 
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financially viable nor finding robust support among the middle classes, the arts in 
Korea has depended heavily upon symbolic and financial backing from the state.  
The susceptibility of the arts sector to politics and governmental control also 
stems from the country’s political circumstance of ‘divided Korea’ and military 
dictatorship. While trying to justify the anti-communist South Korea as the true 
bearer of Korean culture and national identity, the government foisted on society the 
pressing need for political and ideological consensus. The strict censorship of some 
areas of arts and popular culture was an essential part of such effort (Y. Kim 1976, 
Korea Culture & Tourism Policy Institute 2005, Park 2010). During the military 
regime, artists who challenged it were – very often wrongly – labelled as ‘leftist’ (or 
‘anti-government’) and punished. The state’s ideological control over the arts became 
enfeebled with the political democratisation of the 1990s. Nonetheless, one legacy of 
the strong presence of politics in state arts policy was the division within the arts 
sector: between so-called ‘conservative’ groups who established themselves as peak 
organisations during the military regime (for example, Ye-Chong or the Korean Arts 
Organisations Federation) and so-called ‘progressive’ ones who emerged in reaction 
to the regime’s suppression (e.g., Min-Ye-Chong or the Korean People’s Artists 
Federation). The progressive groups also include those who developed as part of the 
broadened civil society after the mid 1990s. Although there are many who do not 
belong to either of the groups, the division has visibly affected the landscape of 
Korean arts policy (Minutes no. 68, 2009, Interviewees 2, 4 and 7).  
We can also look into the ‘developmental’ nature of the Korean state and its 
implications for arts policy (Kwon 1999, 2005, Weiss 1998). From the 1960s the 
country prioritised economic advancement over other public policy goals. In this 
process, the state assumed the proactive and strategic roles of a planner, regulator and 
facilitator. It also functioned as the most powerful actor in marshalling resources and 
coordinating different interests in society. The successful economic performance, in 
turn, was an effective way through which the military government justified its 
authoritarian regime (Park 2010). The private sector was relatively underdeveloped 
and even the rapidly expanding business sector was tightly regulated by the state 
(Eckert 1990-91). Under state leadership, public policy making involved close 
collaboration with peak organisations. Yet, these organisations were unprotected to 
government control and were even seen as ‘official’ or ‘peripheral to the government’ 
(Kwon 1999, p. 29). Such situation was more or less the same in the arts sector. The 
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right to form social groups was seriously limited and their participation in policy 
making was discouraged, sometimes forcibly, until the 1990s.  
It is within these settings that cultural policy development in Korea has taken 
place under the direction of the central government. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
policy’s key priority was the strengthening of Korean cultural identity and protection 
of its cultural heritage. However, a coherent policy framework was still to emerge, 
and public arts subsidy was provided on an ad hoc basis. Following the creation of 
the Ministry of Culture and Public Information in 1968, the 1970s saw a more 
coordinated approach to cultural policy and the structuration of arts funding. The 
Culture and Arts Promotion Law was enacted in 1972 and accordingly the Korea 
Culture and Arts Foundation, as a non-governmental public agency for national arts 
funding, was created in 1973. In 1973, the government, mirroring its economic 
development plans, announced the first five-year plan for cultural development with 
foci on national identity, public access to culture and cultural diplomacy (Y. Kim 
1976). This was followed by a series of cultural development plans drawn up by 
subsequent governments. Throughout this process, the arts sector was regarded 
merely as a ‘benefit recipient’, not an active participant in policy making. Until the 
mid-1990s, Korean cultural policy prioritised expanding the cultural infrastructure, 
protecting traditional culture and cultural identity and raising the profile of Korea 
overseas. Subsequently, political democratisation in the 1990s brought forward new 
agendas such as deregulation, decentralisation, cultural welfare, cultural industries 
development and the globalisation of Korean culture (Park 2010). The period after the 
financial crisis in 1997 witnessed the accelerated liberalisation and deregulation of 
Korean society and the economy. Cultural policy corresponded to such a change by 
giving unprecedented attention to the economic effects of so-called ‘contents 
industries’,10 setting up new central agencies and sharply increasing public funding in 
this area (B.-L. Lee 2004). This was accompanied by a rise of a liberal approach to 
the arts, exemplified by the replacement of the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation 
with ARKO, the Korean version of the arm’s length Arts Council. Nevertheless, arts 
policy in Korea has still been profoundly bounded by its historical and political 
trajectory. 
                                                 
10 In Korean cultural policy, ‘contents industries’ refers to those industries that generate wealth and 
employment by producing and exploiting cultural contents. They include popular music, broadcasting, 
animation, comics, computer/online games, character and mobile contents industries. Unlike the 
‘creative industries’ notion advocated by the British government, contents industries in Korea exclude 
subsidised cultural sectors.  
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Calling for an Arts Council 
Until 2005, the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation (KCAF) was responsible for 
managing the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund, which was raised mainly via a levy 
on entrance fees for cultural venues, and supporting arts activities including literature, 
visual art, music, dance, theatre and traditional Korean arts. The KCAF was a non-
governmental agency but it lacked autonomy (MCT 2004b, Interviewee 1). Its 
president was under the cultural ministry’s direct control, and a huge part of its 
budget was pre-allocated to the ministry’s own projects (M.-K. Lee et al. 2001). 
Artists were involved in its advisory committees but their roles remained peripheral. 
There also were claims that the KCAF’s grant making was short of transparency and 
professionalism and overall favoured conservative associations. The arts sector’s 
dissatisfaction intensified throughout the 1990s and the turn of the century saw the 
Parliamentary Select Committee for Culture and Tourism suggesting the KCAF’s 
reform as a key agenda for arts policy (M.-K. Lee et al. 2001). Another drive for 
reform came from the sector’s concern with the financial predicament of artists and 
their suffering from low social respectability11 (Ahn 2006, Park 2010). Besides, the 
rise of contents industries as the cultural policy’s new priority resulted in a crisis of 
legitimacy for the subsidised arts. The sector’s anxiety deepened further when the 
Constitutional Court concluded in 2003 that it was unconstitutional to fund the arts 
using a levy, which was seen as semi-taxation, and thus it should be abolished. The 
sense of crisis escalated even though the government decided to support the Culture 
and Arts Promotion Fund via some Lottery income from 2004. 
Against this backdrop, the actual impetus to transform the KCAF to an Arts 
Council came from the newly elected Democratic government (2003-2008) (MCT 
2004a). Following the line set by the previous Democratic government (1997-2003), 
the new government aimed at furthering political democracy and economic 
liberalisation. It regarded the Arts Council model of arts funding as corresponding 
                                                 
11 Korean society’s low esteem of artists and art making can be exemplified by the legal dispute around 
the death of the sculptor Bon-Ju Ku in a traffic accident. The initial court decision on financial 
compensation was based on the acknowledgement that 25% of fault was attributable to the victim, the 
retirement age of 65 and the victim’s 6-9 year career as an artist. However, the defence’s insurance 
company appealed against the decision. The company insisted on the acknowledgement of 75% of 
fault on the victim, the retirement age of 60 and non-acceptance of the victim’s career as an artist. The 
victim’s lost earnings were worked out based on the ‘earning of urban workers on daily contracts’, 
which would apply not only to those who provide physical labour on daily contracts but also to the 
unemployed (Ahn 2006). This sparked fierce debates on artists’ position within Korean society. Later 
the insurance company withdrew the appeal and reached a compromise with the family of the deceased. 
 12 
nicely with the spirit of the time, which was characterised by the enlargement of the 
private sector and deregulation. This model was also thought to be in concordance 
with this government’s governance principles of ‘participation’, ‘autonomy’ and 
‘decentralisation’ (Yang 2006, Interviewees 5, 6 and 7). Around 2003, there began a 
plethora of debates on the Arts Council often initiated by the government itself, 
progressive artists associations, for example Min-Ye-Chong, and/or cultural 
campaigning groups. Conservative artists groups were hesitant as they saw the Arts 
Council as potentially instrumental in (over-)strengthening the power and resource of 
the progressive groups (MCT 2003, 2004b, Parliamentary Group for Popular Culture 
and Media Research 2003). Effectively persuaded by the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism, however, the conservative associations joined forces to make a plea for an 
Arts Council just before the Revised Culture and Arts Promotion Bill was put forward 
to the parliament in November 2003. The Revised Bill was passed in December 2004, 
leading to the transformation of the KCAF to the Arts Council Korea (ARKO). 
Briefly, the arts sector reached a consensus on the need for an arm’s length Arts 
Council; however, it was ascribed appreciably to the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism’s leadership and capacity to negotiate with both conservative and 
progressive groups in the sector (Presidential Advisory Committee for Policy 
Planning 2008, Interviewee 7). This implied the frail position of the arts against the 
state and the ARKO’s exposure to forthcoming changes in the broader political 
environment.   
 
‘Instituting’ Arts Council in Korea 
 
Autonomous but quasi-governmental  
[The government intends] to expand significantly the Arts Council’s autonomy in the area of 
projects and budget aimed at supporting culture and the arts by actualising the arm’s length 
principle. (MCT and KCAF 2004 cited in Won 2008, p. 32). 
 
Arts Council Korea (ARKO) began its life in August 2005 as a ‘foundation’, which 
ran a public fund (the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund) on behalf of the government 
and it was put directly under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (later Ministry of 
Culture, Sports and Tourism). Its official goal was ‘subsidising projects and activities 
that promote arts and culture’: here, ‘arts and culture’ referred primarily to literature, 
visual art, performing arts and traditional Korean arts as well as combined arts 
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(http://www.arko.or.kr/arkoinfo01/arkoinfo_010101.jsp Accessed on 5 October 2011). 
The ARKO was a non-governmental organisation but was usually referred to as 
‘private’. This phenomenon might be explained in terms of the arts sector’s suspicion 
over the role of ‘non-governmental’ organisations. By being positioned as ‘private’, 
the ARKO distinguished itself from its predecessor, which was non-governmental but 
operated like a part of the cultural ministry. It was widely supposed that the ARKO 
would play independent roles rather than simply collaborating with the government 
and this would re-define the government’s remit as well:    
[T]he non-governmentally initiated Arts Council Korea was set up to exercise the 
comprehensive right for arts funding policy. Meanwhile, the government’s role was to be 
redefined to now focus on the following areas of law and institutions, cultural infrastructure, 
arts education and training of professional workforce, and policy evaluation. (MCT 2004a, 
p3) 
 
Both the government and the arts sector thought that weighing the ARKO’s 
governing body (the Council) with artists and arts experts was crucial for securing its 
independence. To minimise government intervention, candidates for nomination as 
Council members were self-appointed and then shortlisted by an independent select 
committee according to well-defined criteria before the ministry made the final 
selection. Importantly, the eleven Council members elected their chairperson among 
themselves. In this way, he or she would be free from the hierarchy that used to 
determine the relation between the ministry and the ARKO’s predecessor.   
However, the nature of the ARKO as an ‘autonomous body’ has been 
increasingly contested within the broader policy environment, where the state 
continues to exert heavy control over arts subsidy (K.-L. Chung 2007, Minutes No. 
32 and 37, 2007, Interviewees 1 and 7). Like its predecessor, the ARKO has been 
under tight budgetary control and monitoring by the government. It should consult 
closely with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and the Ministry of Planning 
and Finance until its spending plan receives endorsement from parliament. 
Throughout the process, the ministries can drastically adjust the budget and add new 
projects against the ARKO’s will (Yang 2006, Minutes No. 3, 2005, No. 54, 2008, 
No. 65, 2008, Interviewee 1). The ARKO is also subject to various audit and 
evaluation: most importantly, audits by the parliament, the National Audit Office and 
the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and an annual evaluation by the ministry. 
In addition, its management efficiency is assessed yearly by the Ministry of Planning 
 14 
and Finance. Until 2010, the assessment result placed it in the lowest or the second 
lowest scoring band, putting it under further scrutiny (e.g., Ministry of Planning and 
Finance 2009; Minutes No. 54, 2008 and No. 57, 2008). Government control over the 
ARKO even intensified with the enactment of the Law on the Operation of Public 
Organisations (2007) that newly designated the ARKO as a ‘quasi-governmental’ 
organisation. Following the legal requirements, a Fund Review Committee, which 
included a representative of the cultural ministry as well as external experts in law 
and finance, was set up to oversee the ARKO’s fund management, seriously 
weakening the Council’s power (Interviewee 2). Now the chairperson should be 
directly appointed by and enter yearly contracts with the ministry. Moreover, the 
Ministry of Planning and Finance should appoint the ARKO’s internal auditor and 
could recommend or request the chairperson’s dismissal if he or she showed a 
dissatisfactory management performance (Minutes No. 37, 2007). The ARKO 
showed disappointment and worry regarding the law’s effects but it could not reverse 
the tide (Minutes No. 37, 2007; ARKO 2007). The external monitoring and 
evaluation of the ARKO looks much stronger when considering how the Arts Council 
England is overseen by the government: the latter is audited by the National Audit 
Office only and self-evaluates its performance against its funding agreement with the 
government on an annual basis.  
Summing up, in spite of the frequent rhetoric of ‘private body’, ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘arm’s length principle’, arts funding has been perceived as part of governmental 
affairs as it used to be. The persistence of the strong state in arts funding policy in 
Korea could be interpreted as the inertia of the government, meaning that its 
organisational culture and overall attitude towards the arts could not change in a short 
time (Interviewee 7). We can also point out the cultural ministry’s lack of capability 
to persuade the rest of government to accept that the logic of the arts world and public 
policy could collide, thus the performance of the ARKO or other arm’s length bodies 
under its supervision cannot always best judged by the formal mechanism of audit 
and evaluation. Government control has even been reinforced with the trend of audit 
culture, where the Ministry of Planning and Finance’s managerial approach to public 
policy is increasingly taken as a norm and arts policy cannot be given exceptional 
treatment (Chung 2007, Interviewee 2). Within the multi-layered relationship 
between the ARKO, cultural and planning ministries, parliament and the Audit Office, 
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the arm’s length principle as a political convention has hardly found its place and the 
symbolic meaning of ‘autonomous body’ has been significantly eroded. 
 
Grant making rather than policy making  
The Culture and Arts Promotion Law briefly describes the ARKO’s task as 
‘supporting projects and activities that promote culture and the arts’ and the main role 
of the Council members as ‘reviewing and deciding items about setting, changing and 
implementing basic plans to support projects and activities that promote culture and 
the arts’. Meanwhile, the actual remits of the ARKO have always been open to 
interpretation by the government and the ARKO itself as well as the arts sector. When 
it was created in 2005, there was a belief that, unlike its predecessor, the Arts Council 
should have capacity for ‘policy making’. However, there still existed confusion 
around the scope and level of policy that the ARKO was supposed to make: if the 
ARKO should actively drive the country’s long-term strategies for supporting the arts 
or if its role should be limited to grant distribution (Interviewee 4). In the early years, 
the ARKO was keen to foster its agenda-setting ability. For this purpose, a formal 
structure of Sub-Councils involving Council members and external experts was set up 
to discuss arts policy ideas. However, the Sub-Councils were seen as delving too 
much into issues specific to art-forms, and thus not being effective in developing the 
ARKO’s strategies for national arts funding policy (Interviewee 7). They were also 
blamed for generating another layer of bureaucracy. Accommodating these critiques, 
the ARKO later abolished most of the Sub-Councils.  
In spite of the ARKO’s aspiration to build policy making capacity, it is 
questionable how much it has been able to affect arts funding policy in Korea (Yang 
2006). To the contrary, the broader policy environment determined by the 
government has continuously shaped its policy priorities. Most importantly, the 
alteration in the ARKO’s income stream, triggered by the government-level decision 
making, has resulted in important shifts in its priorities. For example, the provision of 
Lottery money has notably extended the Arts Council’s attention from artists to 
audiences, particularly those who are socially and economically disadvantaged 
(Interviewees 1 and 3). Meanwhile, the ministry’s decision in 2008 to devolve a third 
of the ARKO’s budget to regional and municipal arts foundations seriously shrank its 
responsibility. At the same time, the ARKO was stimulated to explore new roles as a 
national coordinator of arts foundations across the country and to distinguish itself 
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from the foundations through expanded international projects (Interviewees 2 and 3). 
Another observation is that there has been a mismatch between the rhetoric (e.g., ‘[the 
ARKO’s] comprehensive right for arts funding policy’) (MCT 2004a, p. 3) and the 
ARKO’s actual understanding of its remit. The ARKO has tended to focus on the 
narrowly defined ‘private arts’ in order to draw a clear-cut line between itself and the 
cultural ministry and to underpin its non-governmental nature. It seldom shows 
interest in policies for national arts organisations directly financed by the government. 
It has also believed that the government should carry out funding for arts events on a 
national scale, such as the National Dance Festival. At the same time, it has not 
wished to be involved in broader arts politics where different interests and views in 
the arts sector clash and are negotiated. This is evidenced by the fact that it has 
continuously insisted that the cultural ministry should be directly responsible for 
supporting two peak associations, Ye-Chong and Min-Ye-Chong (Minutes No. 54, 
2008, No. 68, 2009). Apparently, the ARKO perceives itself as playing only a limited 
role in the nation’s arts funding policy, while expecting a substantial part of policy 
making, including negotiating with peak organisations, to be done by the government 
as previously.  
 
Consensus seeking without consensus  
It is widely known that the ARKO was intended to be a consensus-based organisation 
(B.-Y. Kim interviewed in Oh 2005, J.-H. Kim 2005, Yang 2005). ‘Consensus’ was 
proposed as an alternative to the hierarchy that characterised state arts funding in 
Korea in the past, where government’s influence was cascaded down to the KCAF 
president and the president monopolised the KCAF’s decision making power. When 
the KCAF was transformed into the ARKO, the expectation was that the formal 
structure of the ARKO’s governing body – consisting of eleven individuals, who 
were knowledgeable about the real life of the arts sector – would organically promote 
consultation with arts professionals and decision making based on consensus in the 
arts sector (Baik 2003, Huh 2005, B.-Y. Kim interviewed in Oh 2005b, J.-H. Kim 
2005, Yang 2005). Nevertheless, there was a serious worry that consensus seeking 
would be meaningless unless the key individuals involved in the ARKO’s decision 
making represented various constituencies in terms of art form, expert area and 
political stance. The most crucial concern of the sector, particularly the conservative 
peak organisations, was whether or not the key positions would be taken mainly by 
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people from progressive groups. This made the issue of ‘appointment’ the focal point 
of debates when the ARKO was set up: e.g., appointment of members of the taskforce 
committee for preparation for the transformation of the KCAF into the ARKO, the 
select committee for short-listing the candidates for Council membership, the Council 
itself, twelve Sub-Councils, several peer review committees and so on (J.-S. Chung 
2003, Oh 2005a, Won 2008, Interviewee 3). Not surprisingly, this resulted in the 
generation of layers of extremely formalised selection processes and criteria (Won 
2008, Yang 2005).  
However, the formal rules never guaranteed an easy development of 
consensus. On the contrary, the existence of complicated formal rules can be seen as 
evidence of the underdevelopment of consensus within the sector. In theory, 
consensus would lead to efficient decision making with minimum conflict, causing 
less time and resource be spent on the formal process of discussion and negotiation. 
Within the context of the ARKO, however, consensus has been understood primarily 
as a ‘process’ of making efforts to reach an agreement, which has turned out to be 
very time and resource consuming: the ARKO Council meetings every two weeks 
could be compared with the three to four Council meetings every year at the Arts 
Council England. Some commentators observe that in reality such a process seldom 
takes place: for example, each of the Council members tends to have more authority 
over issues relating to the area they represent therefore active discussion within the 
Council is likely to be hindered (Interviewee 7).  
The division within the arts sector and the underdevelopment of sectoral 
consensus might be a persuasive explanation for the Council members’ inclination to 
focus more on day-to-day funding decisions than on making policies at macro level 
(Minutes No. 83, 2009, No. 99, 2010). Until recently, the Council members showed 
little confidence in the expertise of the professional staff of ARKO in processing and 
making grant decisions, taking for granted their involvement in the selection of peer 
reviewers (Minutes No. 83, 2009). At the same time, as art form representatives, 
some of the Council members have appeared to feel pressurised to secure a fair share 
of ARKO funding for their art form community. Moreover, the tension between 
conservative and progressive peak organisations has made grant distribution a point 
of potentially fierce debate. The shortage of consensus within the Council was aptly 
demonstrated by a legal dispute around the Council’s funding decision in 2007. It was 
caused as a Council member applied to the court for a provisional disposition of an 
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ARKO project on the basis that the chairperson decided to finance it without a 
resolution of the Council members. The incident, which eventually led to the 
resignation of the chairperson, was seen as a result of various factors, including the 
incongruence in the Council members’ understanding of consensus-based decision 
making and the conflict between the interests of different art forms. Finally, despite 
extremely formalised procedures and criteria devised to achieve maximum fairness 
and transparency in funding decisions, the ARKO – like its predecessor – has never 
been free from complaints, blame and accusations from those who felt excluded and 
disadvantaged (Minutes No. 69, 2009, No. 70, 2009). Overall, the arts sector’s 
dissatisfaction with the ARKO was more about power and resource distribution – i.e., 
the appointment of key individuals and grant decisions – than about ARKO’s mission, 
objectives and roles, indicating the underdevelopment of a sector-wide perspective on 
the very basic features of the ARKO’s operation. 
 
Politics over the Arts Council  
The creation of the ARKO had huge symbolic meaning but hardly brought about a 
new normative and cultural parameter of arts funding policy in Korea. It could not 
simply restyle the state-led arts funding policy that was historically and politically 
embedded. The division in the arts sector and lack of consensus also implied that 
ARKO had an inherent weakness in securing an arm’s length distance from the 
government. In this context, the conservative Grand National government (elected in 
2008) put ARKO seriously to the test (Interviewee 6). The new government did not 
propose a coherent framework for cultural policy but its ideas could be summarised 
as emphasising the economic and social values of culture, preferring focused funding 
to thin distribution of grants, shifting from direct to indirect funding and from pre- to 
post-project funding, and encouraging private funding sources. Contrary to its 
preference for private sector and market driven approaches, the government 
reinforced the strong state when dealing with non-governmental public organisations. 
One possible reason for this phenomenon was its view that the organisations had been 
controlled by those who were close to the previous government and too much power 
and resource had been given to some progressive groups. To ‘restore a balance’ and 
appoint those who shared the government’s ideologies in key places, the new cultural 
minister forced the heads (appointed by the previous government) of fifteen 
organisations including the ARKO to resign or dismissed them:  
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It is natural for the heads of public cultural and arts institutions, who shared political visions 
with the previous government, to resign…People in the cultural and arts sector have their own 
philosophy, ideology, style and characteristics. It would be turning their own life upside-down 
if they remain in their positions even when there is a new government. (IC Yoo, March 2008 
cited in Weekly Kyungyhang 2008)  
 
As for the ARKO chairperson, who refused to resign, the ministry conducted a 
special audit, which was seen as politically driven by many people in the sector. 
Based on the findings of the ARKO’s mistakes with investments and spending, the 
ministry dismissed him in December 2008. Later, a court decision nullified the effect 
of the dismissal, leading to the chaotic situation of the ARKO having two, the 
returned and the newly appointed, chairpersons (Minutes No. 88, 2010). The view 
that sees the ARKO as an empty space for a power struggle between conservative and 
progressive groups was reproduced and exaggerated by some media which tended to 
crudely stigmatise progressive groups as ‘leftist’ (e.g., Donga Ilbo 2006). It is true 
that the members of the progressive association were actively involved in the process 
of making and operating ARKO (Interviewee 2 and 7). Still, ARKO treated both 
progressive and conservative groups as important partners. For instance, it provided 
the same level of annual grant to Ye-Chong and Min-Ye-Chong, from 2005 to 2008. 
This was a political endeavour, rather than an artistic decision, to keep cooperative 
relations with the two most powerful peak organisations in the sector. However, 
artists from the progressive camp – who were generally younger, proactive and more 
accomplished in arts management – turned out to be taking advantage of the move of 
arts policy towards goal-oriented and evidence-based policy making (Minutes No. 68, 
2009). Some conservative arts professionals who could not adapt to the shifting 
environment might have felt unfairly excluded and sympathetic to the Grand National 
government’s effort to ‘restore the balance’. Perhaps they found cooperating with the 
government more critical in securing power and resource than having an autonomous 
arts funding body. 
The huge pressure from the government has undermined the ARKO’s position. 
In 2009 the National Audit Office carried out an audit of a wide range of NGOs, 
including arts organisations that received more than 80 million won (approx. 0.5 
million pounds) from the ARKO. The finding of many instances of wrongdoing, 
including those related to Ye-Chong and Min-Ye-Chong, seriously damaged the 
sector’s legitimacy (Seoul Shinmun 2009). Following this, the ARKO itself took a 
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series of actions that challenged the arm’s length principle. In 2009, it required a 
writers’ association to negate its participation in anti-government demonstrations 
(demonstrations against US beef imports) in 2008 and to give a written pledge not to 
take part again if it wanted to keep its grant (Weekly Seoul 2009). Later that year 
ARKO demanded ‘all’ its clients to submit documentary evidence of their spending 
of its grant for four years from 2006, which was thought by many rather as a 
rhetorical gesture towards the government. The real problem was that the arts sector 
(even the Council members themselves) scarcely responded to the increasing pressure 
from the government with a coordinated voice in defence of the autonomy of the arts 
and ARKO. Apparently, the ARKO’s attempts to cultivate sectoral consensus on the 
arm’s length principle were not very effective within the context of the deeply rooted 
division in the sector and reliance by competing peak organisations on the 
government for resource and power.  
 
Conclusion  
Modelled after the British style of Arts Council, the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) as 
an independent and consensus-based organisation was established in 2005 to make 
and implement arts funding policy. The ARKO was a meaningful policy experiment 
that demonstrated the country’s admiration of artist-led arts policy and its willingness 
to instigate such policy by ‘borrowing’ the Arts Council, an institution initially born 
and developed in Britain. However, the Arts Council has been contested, negotiated 
and localised within the context of arts policy making in Korea.  
This article points out that the Korean understanding of the Arts Council was 
seriously restricted. It rather naïvely focused on the ‘formal’ elements of the Arts 
Council institution while not paying appropriate attention to the normative and 
cultural frameworks that determine the ways the formal organisation and rules work 
in reality. In this sense, the Korean government and the arts sector’s perspective of 
the Arts Council can be described as ‘structural’ and ‘procedural’: they believed that 
once the right structure and procedures were introduced, there would spontaneously 
emerge a new understanding of the state-arts relationship and a new practice of 
operating state arts funding. However, this has not happened. Although the Korean 
government laxly accommodated the rhetoric of the arm’s length principle and the 
arts sector’s participation in arts funding policy, its continuous control over the 
ARKO has not been effectively challenged but has persisted. ARKO’s autonomy, 
 21 
which existed more as ideal rather than in practice, has further declined with the shift 
in policy environment inside and outside arts policy. Meanwhile, the ARKO itself 
appears to define its role in narrowly, requiring a strong state that can carry out a 
crucial part of arts policy making. It should be noted that ARKO’s susceptibility to 
government intervention is attributable, to a great degree, to the arts sector’s internal 
conditions. The sector, lacking popular or middle class support, needed a strong state 
as a pivotal source of funding as well as legitimation. The ARKO hardly changed 
such circumstance as the creation of the organisation itself relied less on an enhanced 
social legitimacy of the arts than on negotiation between the government and peak 
organisations in the arts sector. Furthermore, the tensions derived from the 
historically rooted division within the sector gravely hinder ARKO from making and 
sustaining sectoral consensus concerning its operation and relation to the government. 
The lack of consensus, in turn, seemingly makes the ARKO incompetent to resolve 
the tensions on its own and leaves the arts sector continuously in need of active roles 
to be played by the government as the key coordinator of different interests within the 
sector. 
 The case study of the ARKO provides two implications for further research. 
First, it finds ‘embeddedness’ as a helpful conceptual framework for analysing a 
distinct pattern of cultural policy development in a given country. The framework 
could be also useful when we make sense of why a country cannot simply adopt 
cultural policy strategies and mechanisms emerged in elsewhere without local twist. It 
is also demonstrated that the unexpected style of localisation tends to add complexity 
to the country’s cultural policy by increasing interplay between policy intention and 
consequence and between rhetoric and practice. Second, the case study sheds light on 
the intricate dynamics in the arts-state relationship by looking at the roles the state 
plays in arts policy development when the arts sector is lacking social legitimacy and 
sectoral consensus and thus depends heavily on the state for power and resource. 
Such dynamics could be further contemplated within the context of cultural policy in 
other Asian countries, where the arts have taken a relatively weak position against the 
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